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LABOR LAW
OVERVIEW

The Tenth Circuit handed down four labor opinions during this
survey which merit review. Two additional cases are mentioned in brief.
In Consolidation Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, Local 1261,1 the
Tenth Circuit applied only agency theory in determining that a local
union was not liable for damages due to an unauthorized strike. In so
holding, the court extended to local unions the Supreme Court's test for
determining parent union liability. In Artra Group, Inc. v. NLRB, 2 the
court enforced a Gissel bargaining order and applied the Wright Line
"mixed motive" analysis to uphold the National Labor Relations
Board's (NLRB or Board) rejection of the employer's economic necessity defense in the face of alleged anti-union animus. In Southwest Community Health Services v. NLRB, 3 the Tenth Circuit held that the Board
failed to apply the correct standard in certifying a bargaining unit composed of medical technicians and paramedics. The case was remanded
to the Board to determine the correct bargaining unit under the "disparity of interests" standard. In Barnett v. United Air Lines, Inc.,4 the Tenth
Circuit reversed a district court ruling as to the applicable statute of limitations in a "hybrid contract" suit which sought vacation of an arbitration award under the Railway Labor Act (RLA). The court applied the
six-month statute of limitations under section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) rather than the two year limitation under the
RLA. Donovan v. United Video, Inc., 5 and Jefferson County Community Center
for Developmental Disabilities, Inc. ,6 are discussed briefly.
I.

UNION LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES CAUSED BY UNAUTHORIZED STRIKES

In Consolidation Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, Local 1261,7
the court held that a union local was not liable for damages caused by an
unauthorized strike where local officials played no part in instigating or
condoning the walkout. In affirming the district court's summary judgment decree, the circuit applied only agency theory to the facts of the
case. The court determined that the "best efforts" and "mass action"
theories were no longer valid in view of the Supreme Court's decision in
Carbon Fuel Co. v. United Mine Workers of America.8 Consolidation extends to
1. 725
2. 730
3. 726
4. 738
nying notes
5. 725
6. 732
nying notes
7. 725
8. 444

F.2d 1258 (10th Cir. 1984). See infra text accompanying notes 7-47.
F.2d 586 (10th Cir. 1984). See infra text accompanying notes 48-88.
F.2d 611 (10th Cir. 1984). See infra text accompanying notes 89-131.
F.2d 358 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 594 (1984). See infra text accompa132-52.
F.2d 577 (10th Cir. 1984). See infra text accompanying notes 153-62.
F.2d 122 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 591 (1984). See infra text accompa163-71.
F.2d 1258 (10th Cir. 1984), afg 500 F. Supp. 72 (D. Utah 1980).
U.S. 212 (1979).
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local unions the Court's most recent pronouncements on parent union
liability. 9
A.

Facts of Consolidation

The employer, operator of a coal mine in Emery County, Utah,
brought suit against the local union seeking injunctive relief and damages following an unauthorized walkout at the mine. The walkout took
place pursuant to worker dissatisfaction with the handling of a grievance
filed by a fellow union member. Local officials met immediately after
the walkout with the mine superintendent, but were unable to persuade
the membership to return to work. One local official remained on the
job until threats convinced him to leave work. The union threatened
internal disciplinary action and broadcasted radio announcements in an
effort to end the walkout, but work did not resume until 72 hours after
the strike commenced.' 0 The district court denied injunctive relief and
found the local union not liable under any theory of liability."I
B.

Theories of Liability for Damages Pursuant to Unauthorized Walkouts

Courts have defined three theories of liability for employer damages pursuant to unauthorized walkouts where a no-strike obligation exists in the collective bargaining agreement.
1. Agency Theory
Under Section 301(b) 12 of the Labor Management Relations Act
(LMRA), any labor organization, be it a union or employer, "shall be
bound by the acts of its agents." Section 301(e)13 further defines the
role of an agent and follows the principles of apparent authority by stating that "the question of whether the specific acts performed were actually authorized or subsequently ratified shall not be controlling." Thus,
an agent's actions may bind a union under the common law rules of
agency regardless of whether those actions were specifically authorized
or ratified. Under agency theory, courts examine the actions of stewards, committeemen, and union officers for indications of ratification of
a strike in breach of a no-strike obligation. 14 The Third Circuit has
noted that failure of local union officials to repudiate a purported
agent's ordering of a strike may constitute ratification of the agent's ac5
tions whether or not he had authority.'
9. See, e.g., Complete Auto Transit v. Reis, 451 U.S. 401 (1981) (individual union
members not liable regardless of whether union found liable); Carbon Fuel Co. v. United
Mine Workers of America, 444 U.S. 212 (1979) (parent unions not liable under "mass
action" or "best efforts" theories); Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1962)
(individual members not liable where union found liable for strike damages).
10. 725 F.2d at 1259-60.
11. Id. at 1260.
12. 29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (1982).
13. 29 U.S.C. § 185(e) (1982).
14. Eazor Express, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 520 F.2d 951, 963 (3d Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 935 (1976).
15. Id. at 964.
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It is clear, however, that union officials and rank-and-file members
are not individually liable for wildcat strikes. In Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co.,16 the Supreme Court held that when a union is found liable for
damages due to breach of a no-strike clause, its officers and members
are not individually liable. 17 Likewise, in Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Oil, Chemical
&Atomic Workers InternationalUnion,' 8 the Court announced that when a
union is not liable for breach of a no-strike agreement, no remedy for
damages attends against members individually. 19
2.

Mass Action

A second theory of liability has been used where large groups of
workers walk off the job en masse. Mass action is thought to have
originated in 1948 when a district court ventured that "the idea ... that
• . .350,000 to 450,000 men would all get the same idea at once, independently of leadership, and walk out of the mines, is of course simply
20
ridiculous."
The Third Circuit clarified mass action in Eazor Express Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 2 1 concluding "large groups of men do
not act collectively without leadership

. . .

a functioning union must be

held responsible for the mass action of its members."' 22 Mass action differs from pure agency theory in that authority and ratification are inferred from the concerted action of a large labor organization. In Carbon
Fuel, the Supreme Court undertook the question of whether mass action
could be applied to find liability on behalf of an international or district
union even though the parent unions had no involvement with the local's unauthorized walkout. The Court disavowed Eazor Express 23 and
cited the Fourth Circuit's decision in United Construction Workers v. Haislip
Baking Co. 24 for the proposition that "there is [no] responsibility on the
16. 370 U.S. 238 (1962).
17. Id. at 247-48 (discussing section 301 (b) of the Labor Management Relations Act,
29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (1982)).
18. 452 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1971).
19. Id. at 52 (citing Atkins v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1962)).
20. United States v. United Mine Workers, 77 F. Supp. 563, 566 (D.D.C. 1948), afd,
177 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 871 (1949).
21. 520 F.2d 951 (3d Cir. 1975).
22. Id. at 963 (citations omitted).
23. 444 U.S. at 215. Eazor Express involved a strike over questionable discharges at a
loading dock in northeastern Ohio and an immediately subsequent sympathy strike by a
second local union at Pittsburgh, thereby implicating responsibility to the Teamster International. Both strikes were in breach of no-strike obligations and neither was submitted to
the grievance machinery for resolution. The court found that neither local union instigated or ratified the walkouts, but that the International as party to the collective bargaining agreement nonetheless became liable to the employers 24 hours after the second
walkout began. The parent union's failure to use "all reasonable means to end the unauthorized strike" in violation of the no-strike obligation was deemed the proximate cause of
employer's damages. Eazor Express, 520 F.2d at 965-66.
24. Carbon Fuel, 444 U.S. at 215 (citing Haislip Baking, 223 F.2d 872 (4th Cir. 1955)).
In Haislip Baking, the Fourth Circuit reversed a jury verdict against defendant national
unions. Haislip Baking arose over the dismissal of two employees and a subsequent walkout
by the entire bargaining unit. The circuit stated that employees involved in unauthorized
walkouts may lose some federal protections, but there is no responsibility on behalf of the
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part of a union for a strike with which it has had nothing to do." '2 5 Fundamental to the court's refusal to recognize mass action was Congress'
clear intention under section 30126 to limit liability to situations where
27
agency could be found.
3.

Best Efforts

Closely related to the mass action theory is the best efforts theory,
which the Third Circuit also championed in Eazor Express.2 8 Best efforts
is based solely on the obligation of a union to use all reasonable means
to end a walkout where the union is party to a no-strike clause and the
accompanying arbitration process. The Third Circuit said that in the
case of a suit for damages incurred during an unauthorized walkout, a
union is estopped to disclaim responsibility unless it has used all reasonable means to end the walkout. 29 Thus, best efforts can be distinguished from the two theories set forth above as being based on
contractual other than agency principles. It should be noted though,
that in the case of an unauthorized walkout, neither of the parties to a
collective bargaining agreement realistically could be held to the obligation if the walkout was not conceived, advocated, or ratified by union
officials. Rather, the walkout is the responsibility of individual workers
who are not party to the agreement. In Carbon Fuel, the Supreme Court
doused "best efforts" by finding that a union which repeatedly disavowed wildcat strikes could not be found liable for failure to use all
reasonable means to end a wildcat walkout simply because Congressional policy favors arbitrating industrial disputes. 30 Furthermore, the
Court clarified its position on the contractual foundation of best efforts
liability, stating that unless full responsibility for wildcat walkouts appears as a bargained-for provision in a collective bargaining agreement
31
such responsibility could not be read into the parties' contract.
C.

The Tenth Circuit's Interpretationof Carbon Fuel in Consolidation

In Consolidation the Tenth Circuit upheld the lower court ruling, refusing to find the local liable under mass action or best efforts theories. 3 2 The Court applied agency theory to the facts but found no
evidence to suggest the local "instigated, supported, ratified, or encouraged the actions" of the mine workers in their decision to walk
union for a strike in which it took no part. The litigants in Haislip Baking were parties to a
no-strike pledge similar to that in Eazor Express, supra note 23.
25. 223 F.2d at 877.
26. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982) provides a cause of action in contract by or against labor
organizations.
27. See, e.g., Carbon Fuel, 444 U.S. at 217.
28. 520 F.2d 959. "Best efforts" is also known as the "all reasonable means" test. See
id. at 959-60.
29. Id.
30. 444 U.S. at 218.
31. Id. at 221-22.
32. 725 F.2d at 1260.
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out. 33 Significantly, the court held that the Supreme Court's decision in
Carbon Fuel applied to local unions, even though the Court in Carbon Fuel
considered only the obligations of parent unions.3 4 The circuit court
was careful not to preclude best efforts or mass action theories of liability where the parties have specifically bargained for an "all reasonable
35
means" obligation in their agreement.
D.

Conclusion

The Tenth Circuit's opinion in Consolidationis firmly in line with Carbon Fuel in holding that neither mass action nor best efforts survived the
Supreme Court's decision. The fact that mass action and best efforts
theories are usually applied to local unions coupled with the reminder
that Carbon Fuel pertained solely to parent unions, indicates a conceptual
leap by the Tenth Circuit in Consolidation. By extending the Court's
holding in Carbon Fuel to local unions, the court of appeals has clarified
the boundaries of agency liability. That the Court in Carbon Fuel failed to
find union liability based only upon an arbitration clause where the parties have not bargained for an explicit obligation to use all reasonable
means to end a wildcat strike3 6 is broad enough to discredit the best
efforts theory at all levels of union hierarchy.
Likewise, the Court's indictment of Eazor and endorsement of Haislip on the issue of a union's lack of responsibility for strikes in which it is
not involved3 7 is sufficiently broad to discredit the mass action theory at
all levels. In reviewing the legislative history of section 301, the Court
seems to have convinced itself that Congress took great care to construct a shield of immunity around unions which could only be broken
by proof of agency.3 8 Mass action liability infers authority and ratification from the circumstances, but it does not require proof of these elements of agency theory.
The other circuits have not interpreted Carbon Fuel as applicable to
locals. The Fourth Circuit, champion of "mass action," stated in Consolidation Coal Co. v. Local 1702, United Mine Workers of America3 9 that the
mass action theory remains "a sensible and pragmatic approach to this
difficult problem in the area of labor relations."'40 The circuit applied
mass action to a local union, distinguishing Carbon Fuel based upon the
33. Id. at 1263. In a footnote the court of appeals pointed out that the district court
had found no ratification of the wildcat strike by the failure of union officials, in the face of
threats, to work their preassigned shifts in the three-days walkout. Id. n. 12. But see Consolidated Coal Co. v. Local 1702 United Mine Workers, 709 F.2d 882, 884, 886 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 487 (1983).
34. 444 U.S. at 215 n.3; 725 F.2d at 1261 n.7.
35. Id. at 1263 n.1 1; accord Carbon Fuel 444 U.S. at 721-22.
36. 444 U.S. at 218.
37. Id. at 215.
38. Id. at 218.
39. 709 F.2d 882 (4th Cir. 1983).
40. Id. at 885 (quoting Carbon Fuel, 582 F.2d 1346, 1349-50 (4th Cir. 1978), afd,444
U.S. 212 (1979)).
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Court having only the district and international unions before it. 4 1 The
Fourth Circuit had affirmed a finding of liability against the local unions
in CarbonFuel4 2 based on the mass action theory of liability, and appears
reluctant to retreat from its holding.
In North River Energy Corp. v. United Mine Workers of America,43 the
Eleventh Circuit, without mentioning Carbon Fuel, affirmed the validity of
the mass action theory but declined to apply it to an Alabama wildcat
strike. In explaining its view of mass action the court sought a "correlation" between the actions of the union as an entity speaking and acting
through its officers, and the actions of its membership. 44 This language
suggests a test more strict than that of Eazor Express which looks only to
large concert of unlawful action regardless of what union leaders might
have said or done in instigating a walkout; thus, the Eazor Express criteria
is similar to a strict liability test.
The Tenth Circuit in Consolidation follows a parade of cases which
45
make recovery of damages for wildcat walkouts increasingly difficult.
Because individual union members can not be found liable for damages,
and union entities are shielded from liability unless their leadership has

taken an active role, employers can only look to the bargaining agreement 4

6

or Boys Markets injunctions
II.

A.

47

for relief.

BARGAINING ORDERS AND BURDEN OF PROOF

NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.
In

NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.,48 the Supreme Court upheld the

Board's practice of compelling employers to bargain with a designated
union where the employer has engaged in unfair labor practices suffi49
cient to render a certification election biased.

The Court found the

Board issuance of a bargaining order to be a valid alternative remedy to
41. The Fourth Circuit also found the local union liable under agency theory. By
taking only actions which were "foresecably ineffective," the local union had ratified and
tacitly encouraged the strike. ConsolidationCoal, 709 F.2d at 885-86.
42. Carbon Fuel Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 582 F.2d 1346 (4th Cir.
1978), affid 444 U.S. 212 (1979).
43. 664 F.2d 1184 (11 th Cir. 1981).
44. Id. at 1194 (citing Consolidation Coal Co., 500 F. Supp. at 77).
45. See supra, note 9.
46. The controlling principle after Carbon Fuel is that such a contract term must be
bargained-for and specific as to each party's duties, and not ambiguously stated, e.g., when
the parties "agree and affirm that they will maintain the integrity of this contract." See
Carbon Fuel, 444 U.S. at 216.
47. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerk's Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970). Boys
Markets provides an exception to the no injunction rule of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Specifically, an action in equity to enjoin a strike can only be had where the strike is over a
grievance which both parties have agreed to arbitrate, and the employer should be compelled to arbitrate such a grievance. Id. at 254 (citing Sinclar Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370
U.S. 195, 228 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting)). All other principles of equity attendant to
an injunction order must be met.
48. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
49. Gissel Packing, 395 U.S. at 600. The National Labor Relations Act enumerates unfair labor practices which can be committed by an employer in section 8(a), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(l)-(5) (1982).
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an election where the employer abrogates his duty to bargain in good
faith under the NLRA. 50 Under Gissel, the Board may determine
whether an employer's anti-union campaign constitutes unfair labor
practices to the extent a cease and desist order is inadequate, or where
an employer's activities have been so egregious that a bargaining order
is the only fair remedy. 5 1 The Court's decision in Gissel precludes employers' from delaying elections while the Board considers whether evidence warrants a cease and desist order. 52 The Court in Gissel was quick
to point out, and the Tenth Circuit has repeated, however, that a bargaining order is not a permanent remedy. 53 Employees may always
54
decertify a union after the Board orders bargaining.
B.

NLRB v. Wright Line

In NLRB v. Wright Line, A Division of Wright Line, Inc. ,55 the First Circuit affirmed the Board's procedural analysis in "mixed motive cases"
where an employee alleges his discharge or discipline resulted from
anti-union animus and the employer asserts valid motives from such action. 56 Anti-union animus can be defined broadly as prejudicial hiring,
firing, or administration of work rules based upon employees' exercise
of activities protected under sections seven 5 7 and eight 58 of the NLRA.
Under the "partial motivation test" 5 9 used prior to Wright Line, the
Board could order reinstatement of an employee accused of bad conduct whenever the General Counsel could prove dismissal was based
partially on union activism. Hence, the rule left union proponents insulated from discharge or appropriate discipline regardless of their em60
ployment activity.
Under the Wright Line analysis, a "but for" test is applied to determine whether a discharge would have occurred regardless of the employee's pro-union actions. 6 1 Once the general counsel establishes the
prima facie existence of an unfair labor practice, i.e., "discrimination in
regard to hire or tenure of employment,"'6 2 the burden of production
shifts to the employer to show that no unfair labor practice occurred and
that the employee would have been discharged regardless of his union
50. The duty of bargaining in good faith arises under section 8(a)(5) of the Act, 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982).
51. Gissel Packing, 395 U.S. at 610-14.
52. Id. at 610-11.

53. Id. at 613 (citing Franks Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702, 705-06 (1944)); NLRB
v. Groendyke Transport, Inc., 417 F.2d 33, 35 (10th Cir. 1969) (citing Franks Bros., 321

U.S. 702), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 935 (1970).
54. See, e.g., Gissel Packing, 395 U.S. at 613.
55. 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981).
56. Id. at 907.
57. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982). Section 7 protects workers' right to form and join a
union, bargain collectively, and engage in concerted activities.
58. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1982). See supra note 49.
59. Wright Line, 662 F.2d at 902.
60. Id. (citations omitted).
61. Id. at 903.
62. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982).
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activity. 6 3 The General Counsel still has the burden of showing by a
preponderance that an unfair labor practice transpired, i.e., but for the
64
employee's union related activities he would not have been dismissed.
65
Thus, section 10(c) of the NLRA, requiring the Board to prove all elements of an unfair labor practice, was not violated because the company
was not presented with a greater burden of persuasion than that which
66
the Board could properly shift to it.
The Supreme Court altered Wright Line to a small degree in NLRB v.
TransportationManagement Corp. ,67 which held that it was fair to shift the
burden of persuasion to the employer to prove that no anti-union ani68
mus was involved in the treatment of a union-sympathyzing employee.
The Court held that the First Circuit erred in interpreting section 10(c),
stating that nothing "forbids placing the burden on the employer to
prove that absent improper motivation" it would have discharged the
employee for legitimate reasons. 69 Thus, the employer may proffer an
70
affirmative defense to this effect, to which it bears the burden of proof.
C.

Artra Group v. NLRB

In the Artra Group, Inc. v. NLRB, 7 1 the Board brought unfair labor
practice charges under sections 772 and 8(a)(1), 73 against a small
Oklahoma electronics manufacturer. The Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ) found fifteen separate violations of the Act, including interrogation of and threats to employees, surveillance of union activities, and
two substantial layoffs designed to remove union leaders from the bargaining unit,7 4 concluding that the company used these coercive tactics
to impede the organization of a union. Accordingly, the ALJ enjoined
the employer's anti-union activity and ordered reimbursement with back
pay for laid off employees. Additionally, without providing a rationale,
the ALJ issued a bargaining order based upon the discriminatory impo75
sition of rules and coercive threats, including closure.
The employer appealed the ALJ's adjudication to the NLRB. The
Board upheld the ALJ's efforts in general, with slight but unsubstantial
modifications. 76 The Board did, however, make two significant determi63. Wright Line, 662 F.2d at 906-07. The firing of a union employee, even a union
activist, is not an unfair labor practice if his employer took the action for business reasons.
The issue goes to motive of the employer.
64. Id. at 906, n. 12.
65. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982).
66. Wright Line, 662 F.2d at 903-04, 904 n.8.
67. 462 U.S. 393 (1983).
68. Id. at 2475.
69. Id. at 2474.
70. Id. at 2473.
71. 730 F.2d 586 (10th Cir. 1984).
72. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
73. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1982).
74. Artra Group, 730 F.2d at 589.
75. Id. at 593. Presumably, the Act determined that a fair election was unlikely due to
bias invoked by the employer's threats and prejudice.
76. Id. at 589.
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nations. First, it rejected the company's contention that it was unaware
of the union's organizational activities which would have precluded a
finding of anti-union animus. 7 7 Second, the Board provided its own ra78
tionale for the extraordinary bargaining order issued by the ALJ.
The employer challenged the Board's affirmance on several
grounds. First, the employer claimed that evidence of economic necessity was inadequately considered by both the ALJ and the Board. The
Tenth Circuit pointed out, however, that while the Board "could have
written a more detailed opinion," it could properly rely on the ALJ's
conclusions regarding the economic evidence. 79 Moreover, the court
80
noted, the ALJ's conclusion did not constitute an abuse of discretion.
Second, the employer asserted that the Wright Line analysis had not been
applied in considering its economic evidence, however sufficient. In re8
sponse, the court noted that the ALJ had clearly applied Wright Line '
and, more importantly, the company's evidence of economic necessity
was simply insufficient as an affirmative defense. 82 Third, the employer
challenged the Board's conclusion that it had knowledge of the union
organization activities. On this point, the Tenth Circuit concluded that
the factual determinations of the ALJ provided evidence in the record
from which the Board could infer the employer's knowledge. 83 Finally,
the court affirmed the bargaining order, reasoning that the Board's determination of a proper "remedy is entitled to special respect." ' 8 4 On
each point the Tenth Circuit stated specifically, or clearly inferred, that
the conclusion of the ALJ and determination by the Board were sup85
ported by substantial evidence.
D.

Conclusion

In Artra Group, the Tenth Circuit has indicated it will not question
detailed procedural analysis of the NLRB where the evidence clearly
demonstrates an unfair labor practice. 8 6 Unfortunately, however, the
court accepts the Board's meager analysis for enforcing compelled bargaining. The issuance of a Gissel bargaining order is an extraordinary
remedy, rarely levied by the Board. It defeats the purposes of elective
bargaining between the parties, and should only be issued where the
facts clearly warrant bypassing the traditional secret ballot election pro77. Id. at 592.
78. Id. at 589-90 (quoting Dutch Boy. Inc., Glowlite Division and International Union
and Electrical Radio and Machine Workers, 262 N.L.R.B. 1 (1982)).
79. 730 F.2d 590.
80. Id. at 591. The ALJ simply concluded that the company had altered its financial
records and, therefore, its defense was not credible. Id. at 592.
81. Id.
82. See, e.g., id. at 591-92.
83. Id. at 592-93.
84. Id. at 593.
id. at 590 (citing Ann Lee Sportswear, Inc. v. NLRB, 543 F.2d 739 (10th
85. See, e.g.,
Cir. 1976)).
86. The Board made 15 separate findings of fact which lent support to the opinion
that the employer had committed numerous unfair labor practices. See supra note 74 and
accompanying text.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 62:1

cess. In contrast, the Seventh Circuit requires the NLRB to give a detailed analysis of its justifications for bypassing this process as an aid to
judicial review. 87 The Tenth Circuit, however, holds that the Board's
choice of remedy, regardless of its extraordinary nature, is entitled to
the same narrow review afforded most administrative actions by the
board. 8 8
III.

A.

BARGAINING UNIT DETERMINATION IN THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY

Non-Proliferationof Bargaining Units in the Medical Industry
1.

Legislative History

In 1974 Congress amended section 2(2) of the National Labor Relation Act 8 9 to include employees in non-profit hospitals under federal
protection and coverage. 90 Legislators in both the House and Senate
discussed the issue of labor interruptions in the health care field and
warned against the proliferation of bargaining units at health care facilities. 91 Congress was concerned that labor conflicts would cause interruptions or slowdowns in the delivery of health care, and that wage
"whipsawing,,"9 2 striking in succession the several employers of a bargaining unit, would increase health care costs. 93 Additionally, Congress
noted that unlike goods and materials, medical care is not "storable,"
and that a hospital strike could be extremely detrimental to patient
care. 94 Moreover, organizational efforts themselves adversely affect pa95
tient care.
The Senate rejected efforts to restrict the number of bargaining
units in non-profit hospitals to four: professional employees, technical
96
employees, clerical workers, and service and maintenance employees.
87. Red Oaks Nursing Home, Inc. v. NLRB, 633 F.2d 503, 508-09 (7th Cir. 1980).
The court points out that "even a cursory examination of the decisions apply Gissel in this
circuit and other circuits reveals that the Board has declined repeatedly to assist the Courts
with this expertise by revealing reasons for issuing Gissel bargaining orders." Id. at 508.
88. Artra Group, 730 F.2d at 593 (citing Gissel, 395 U.S. at 613 n.32).
89. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1982).
90. Act of July 26, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-360, § 2(2), 88 Stat. 295. See NLRB v. St.
Francis Hospital of Lynwood, 601 F.2d 404, 411-13 (9th Cir. 1979), for a discussion of
legislative history behind this change.
91. NLRB v. St. Francis Hospital of Lynwood, 601 F.2d 404, 411-12 (9th Cir. 1979)
(citations to Congressional debate omitted).
92. Id.
93. NLRB v. Anchorage Businessmen's Ass'n, 289 F.2d 619, 621 n.3 (9th Cir. 1961)
(citing NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union, 353 U.S. 87, 90 n.7 (1957)).
94. S. REP. No. 766, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1974), reprinted in2 [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS, 3946, 3953 (views of Sen. Dominick), cited in St. Francis Hospital of
Lynwood, 601 F.2d at 411. Mr. Dominick of Colorado expressed opposition to the compromise bill which eventually passed, warning that it would open health care institutions to
organizational drives and similar disruptions, thereby impeding the administering of vital
services. He predicted that even in large cities where there is no alternative to hospitals
which provide specialized services, labor interruptions common to other industries could
be problematic. Id. at 40.
95. Presyterian/St. Luke's Medical Center v. NLRB, 723 F.2d 1468, 1473 (10th Cir.
1983). Union solicitation does not enjoy the presumption of protected concerted activity
in patient care areas.
96. See St. Francis Hospital, 601 F.2d at 411 (citations omitted).
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Congress did, however, admonish the Board to prevent proliferation of
such units in the health care industry. 9 7 Specifically, it warned that hospitals, given their critical community service, should not suffer the same
and labor-management problems as the construction
administrative
98
industry.
2.

The Community of Interests Standard

The NLRA gives the Board few specific instructions of how to determine appropriate bargaining units. 99 The Board has established the
"community of interests" standards when determining the makeup of
units, based upon parameters found in sections 7100 and 9(b)1 0 1 of the
Act. Section 9(b) instructs the board to "assure ... employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by" the Act, and section
7 allows employees to engage in concerted activities such as forming,
joining, and bargaining as, a union. In order to allow employees to effectively communicate their vocational or professional interests, the
Board groups employees, according to job classification, into units
based upon similarity of terms and conditions of employment, duties,
02
qualifications, earnings, and proximity as well as their stated desires.'
Unit determination has a significant impact on the nature of collective
as different groups
bargaining. For instance, a larger unit may10 fragment
3
of employees promote separate interests.
3.

The Disparity of Interests Standard

Until August of 1984 the NLRB and the circuit courts of appeals
battled over unit determination in non-profit hospitals. 10 4 The majority
of the pre-Reagan Board invoked consistantly its specialized experience
and authority to determine appropriate units regardless of Congress'
admonition against unit proliferation.' 0 5 The circuit courts of appeals
often rejected the Board's determinations and, on occasion, reprimanded the Board's hypocritical approach. 10 6 In Allegheny General Hospital v. NLRB, 10 7 the board reconsidered but refused to reverse its
97.

S. REP. No. 766, 93D CONG., 2D SESS. 5 (1974), repinted in 2 [1974] U.S. CODE

CONG. & AD. NEWS, 3946, 3950.
98. 120 CONG. REC. 12945 (1974) (statement of co-sponsor Sen. Taft).
99. A. Cox, D. BOK, and W. GORMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW, 274 (9th

ed. 1981).
100. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
101. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1982).
102. A. Cox, supra note 99, at 275.
103. See, e.g., Mallinkrodt Chemical Works, 162 N.L.R.B. 387 (1966) (where the Board
announced a new standard for determining whether a group of craftsmen should constitute a separate unit).
104. See Mary Thompson Hosp. v. NLRB, 621 F.2d 858, 864 (7th Cir. 1980), Alleghany Gen'l Hosp. v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 965, 966, 970 (3d Cir. 1979), and St. Vincent's
Hosp. v. NLRB, 567 F.2d 588, 592-93 (3d Cir. 1977), for some of the more outstanding
clashes between the Board and the Circuits.
105. J. ABODEELY, R. HAMMER, and A.L. SANDLER, THE NLRB AND THE APPROPRIATE
BARGAINING UNIT, 265-66 (rev. ed. 1981).

106. See, e.g., Allegheny Gent7 Hosp. 608 F.2d at 966.
107. Id. at 965.
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determination of a maintenance employees' unit after the Third Circuit
had remanded to the Board a nearly identical case' 0 8 for reconsideration in light of Congressional sentiment. The circuit denied enforcement of the Board's order which sought to carve out an operating
engineers unit from the existing maintenance employees unit, citing
stare decisis. 10 9 Despite reprimands such as this, the Board applied the
community of interests standard of American Cyanimid Co. 110 throughout
the 1970s and early 1980s.
The Ninth and Tenth Circuits pioneered the "disparity of interests"
standard in refusing to enforce Board unit determination orders in
I
I and Presbyterian/St.Luke's Medical Center v.
NLRB v. St. FrancisHospital"
l 2
In St. Francis Hospital, the Ninth Circuit borrowed the term
NLRB. "
"disparity of interests" from Senator Williams' statement in the legislative history of the 1974 amendments."1 3 The court distinguished "community of interests," which groups employees into smaller units based
on traditional factors, from "disparity of interests," which focuses upon
those differences between groups that inhibit larger bargaining units.' "4
The term is an unfortunate one. "Disparity of differences" better describes the applicable standard. The Tenth Circuit shed a great deal
more light on the terminology in Presbyterian/St.Luke's Medical Center,' 15
where it stated:
It is . . . the dissimilarity of interests relevant to the collective
bargaining process that determines which employees are not to
be included in a proposed unit. The proper approach is to begin with a broad proposed unit and then exclude employees
with disparate interests. One should not start with a narrow
unit, such as registered nurses, and then add professionals with
similar interests.' 16
The Second and Eighth Circuits have criticized the "disparity of interests" standard applied by the two western circuits as too restrictive of
the employees' right to choose a bargaining representative""1 7 and as
requiring unnecessarily large, unmanageable units." 18
108. See St. Vincent's Hosp. v. NLRB, 567 F.2d 588 (3d Cir. 1977).
109. Allegheny Genl Hosp., 608 F.2d at 970 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137 (1803)). "For the Board to predicate an order on its disagreement with this
court's interpretation of a statute is for it to operate outside the law. Such an order will
not be enforced." Atlegheny, 608 F.2d at 970.

110. 131 N.L.R.B. 909, 910 (1961).
111. 601 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1979).
112. 653 F.2d 450 (10th Cir. 1981).
113. St. Francis Hosp., 601 F.2d at 419 (citing Mercy Hospital of Sacramento, Inc., 217
N.L.R.B. 765, 766-67 (1975) (citation to Sen. Williams' remarks omitted)).
114. St. Francis Hosp., 601 F.2d at 419.
115. 653 F.2d 450 (10th Cir. 1981).
116. Id. at 457-58 n.6.
117. Trustees of Masonic Hall and Asylum Fund v. NLRB, 699 F.2d 626, 642 (2d Cir.
1983).
118. Cf. Watonwan Memorial Hosp. v. NLRB, 711 F.2d 848, 850 (8th Cir. 1983).
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Southwest Community Health Services v. NLRB

In Southwest Community Health Services, 1 9 the Board certified a group
of 54 ambulance service employees intricately connected with the operator's eleven facilities, but the operator alleged the unit's impropriety and
refused to bargain with it. Unfair labor practice charges were filed
against the operator on which the Board granted General Counsel's motion for summary judgment.120 The Board petitioned the Tenth Circuit
for enforcement of its summary judgment order.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit first noted that its standard of review
was not the usual "arbitrary and without substantial support" test,' 2 '
but rather the desparity of interests standard.' 2 2 The court noted that
although the justifications considered by the regional director for certification could support the presumption that the ambulance service employees performed significantly different work than that performed by
potentially included groups, the correct presumption in the health care
industry is that employees in other classifications might have a disparity
of differences such that their inclusion would be appropriate.1 23 The
circuit did not hold the unit inappropriate per se, but remanded to the
12 4
Board for reconsideration under the appropriate standard.
C.

St. Francis Hospital and International Brotherhood of Electric
Workers Local 474

In August, 1984, the Board announced it would no longer apply the
community of interests standard to non-profit hospital unit determinations.1 2 5 It declined, however, to adopt the strict interpretation of "disparity of interests," and, instead, formulated a balancing test which
considers the congressional instructions along with differences between
employee groups.' 26 The Board emphasized that "no unit is per se appropriate," and, henceforth, separate representation would be based
upon the facts of each case in light of the "disparity of interests" standard;' 2 7 yet, it cautioned that strict division of employees into profes12 8
sional and non-professional units is unwarranted.
D.

Conclusion

The Board, reconstituted in the image of the Reagan administration, has reduced tension with the courts of appeals on the health units
119. Southwest Community Health Services, 726 F.2d 611 (10th Cir. 1984).
120. Id. at 613.
121. 726 F.2d at 613 (citing Beth Israel Hosp. and Geriatic Cen. v. NLRB, 688 F.2d
697 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1025 (1982)).
122. 726 F.2d at 613 (citing Presbytarian/St.Lukes Medical Cen., 653 F.2d at 457; St. Francis Hosp., 601 F.2d at 419).
123. Southwest Community Health Services, 726 F.2d at 613-14.
124. Id. at 614.
125.

St. Francis Hospital, 271 N.L.R.B. No. 160, 1984-85, NI.RB Dec. (CCH)

126. Id. at 15-16.
127. Id. at 17.
128. Id. at 16-17.

16,590.
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issue, indicating that cases like Southwest Community Health Services will be
fewer in the future. Given the persistant, often sharp remonstrances by
the courts, the Board had little choice but to move toward what the circuit courts consider to be a strong congressional mandate.
In labor law, volatile issues must be examined from at least two perspectives. Labor groups feel justifiably more comfortable in smaller
units, especially at the bargaining table, where their unique needs in the
mandatory bargaining areas of wages, hours, and terms of employment 129 are considered more carefully. Additionally, hospitals, with
their diverse array of services, lend themselves to proliferation of bargaining units. Coupled together, these two factors explain why it took
the Board a decade to implement Congress' non-proliferation compromise, and even then not without a hint of mitigation.
The disparity of differences standard will reduce the number of bargaining units certified by the Board. In theory, this will promote peaceful labor relations. Yet the real result may be a displacement of tensions
into the arena of unit fragmentation. Congress defeated a bill which
would have mandated four reasonably well-defined units 130 in the final
legislation, presumably because its categorizations were unduly restrictive. It would hardly reflect true congressional intent for the Board to
adopt more a restrictive standard of unit determination than that rejected by Congress. Due to the patent vagueness of the legislative history, ' 3 ' the Tenth Circuit and its sister courts should now watch for unit
determinations in the health care field which are too rigid to effect the
rights conferred in section 7 and the duty of the Board found in section
9(b) of the Act.

IV.
A.

LIMITATIONS OF HYBRID ACTIONS UNDER THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT
3
Barnett v. United Air Lines'

2

Frank Barnett, an employee of United Air lines and a member of the
Association of Flight Attendants (AFA), filed a grievance concerning his
seniority status under a collective bargaining agreement between United
and the union. The Railway Labor Act (RLA)' 3 3 mandates an adjustment board, established by each airline and railway carrier, which has
jurisdiction over minor labor grievances which do not merit attention of
the National Mediation Board. 13 4 The system adjustment board, which
129. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982).
130. S. 2292, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); see, e.g., STAFF OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON LABOR
OF THE SENATE COMMITrEE ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., Legislative History of the Coverage of Nonprofit Hospitals Under the National Labor Relations
Act, 1974 (Comm. Print 1974) (S. 2292, reprinted at 449-61).
131. J. ABODEELY, supra note 105 at 276.
132. 738 F.2d 358 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 594 (1984).

133. 45 U.S.C. § 151 to 188 (1982).
134. 45 U.S.C. § 184 (1982) outlines procedures for the establishment of system,
group, or regional boards of adjustment. The system adjustment board utilized by United
and the AFA is not unlike an arbitration panel established by many industries and unions.
Under 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982) the National Mediation Board can enpanel a National Air
Transport Adjustment Board to handle major disputes. See gernerally De La Rosa Sanchez

1984]

LABOR LAW

included representatives of both the airline and the AFA, denied Barnett's grievance. He subsequently filed a "hybrid contract" action
against the airline for breach of contract and against the union for
13 5
breach of the implied duty of fair representation.
The drafters of the RLA failed to anticipate hybrid actions such as
Barnett, consequently no directly applicable statute of limitations appears in the Act. The court reviewed Barnett twice. In its initial opinion
in March, 1984, it overruled the district court's use of the state statute
and substituted the RLA's two-year limit.'

36

The court determined that

Congress intended to provide the airline industry with a statutory
scheme similar to the rail industry; thus, the two year limitation of Na13 7
tional Railroad Adjustment Board (NRAB) actions was applicable.
The court did not consider the similarity between Barnett's action and
hybrid contract suits under the NLRA.
In June, 1984, the Tenth Circuit withdrew its March decision and
substituted the present ruling. 138 Citing DelCostello v. InternationalBrotherhood of Teasters,139 the Supreme Court decision which applied the
NLRA six-month limit to hybrid claims, the circuit ruled the NLRA statute applies to hybrid RLA suits as well.
B.

DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters

Hybrid labor actions involve two suits. The first is a breach of contract suit brought under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA). 14 0 The second is a breach of duty of fair
representation claim brought against the union. The latter is implied
from the NLRA and recognized by the Court as a necessary remedy due
to the union's obligation to represent all of its members in an honest
and aggressive fashion. 14 1 Most hybrid actions arise from arbitration
decisions where the union member feels he was inadequately reprev. Eastern Airlines, 574 F.2d 29, 31, 32 (lst Cir. 1978) (jurisdiction on each board
detailed).
135. "Hybrid" actions are cognizable in federal courts and, thus, are an exception to
the pre-emption doctrine enunciated in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon,
359 U.S. 236 (1959). The cause of action known as "breach of the duty of fair representation" was first recognized in Steele v. Louisville and Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192
(1944), where a minority employee sued both his employer and a union under the RLA.
Though the action sounds in unfair labor practice, the Board did not recognize it until
1962. and the courts until 1966. In Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967), the Court extended federal court jurisdiction to hybrid suits, based in part on the courts' power to
review arbitration decisions and in part on an employee's right to a remedy where neither
the employer nor the union will afford her one. See id. at 184-86.
136. Barnett v. United Air LInes, Inc., 729 F.2d 693 (10th Cir.), vacated, 738 F.2d 358,
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 594 (1984).
137. Barnett, 729 F.2d at 696.
138. 738 F.2d 358 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 594 (1984).
139. 103 S. Ct. 2281 (1983).
140. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982) provides for suits by and against unions and employers
sounding in contract.
141. In Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967), the Court held a union's duty of representation "includes" a statutory obligation to serve the interests of all members without hostility or discrimination toward any." Id. at 177.
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sented or not represented at all and, subsequently, brings a claim
against both the employer and the union. In DelCostello, the employee
refused to drive a truck he felt was unsafe and, as a result, was dismissed.
He filed a grievance and lost at arbitration.' 42 Ordinarily, system adjustment board decisions are subject to very limited review by the
courts, 14 3 but hybrid actions receive full review by the federal courts if
the plaintiff shows that the union breached its implied duty to handle the
14 4
worker's grievance fairly.
In DelCostello, the lower courts applied different statutes of limitation to the workers' hybrid claims. The Court overruled the decisions in
both companion cases, holding that federal courts should not borrow a
state statute where a federal statute provides guidance more reflective of
the practicalities of the specific litigation.' 4 5 The Court reasoned that
section 10(b) of the NLRA, governing the handling of unfair labor prac46
tice cases, was more analogous to hybrid actions than state remedies'
47
and lended itself to uniformity in section 301 actions.'
Thus, DelCostello implemented the six-month limit of section 10(b).
C.

Discussion

In Barnett, the court's application of DelCostello to hybrid RLA suits
stretches the Supreme Court's holding. While the state statutory limit is
less appropriate than a federal limit, the proper issue is which federal
statute of limitations is appropriate for hybrid RLA actions. The court
found "identical competing interests" between DelCostello and Barnett, in
rejecting the RLA two-year limitation.' 4 8 The comparison is deceiving.
The interests in DelCostello were those of the state and federal statutes of
limitations, where the federal limitation appears in the Act under which
the cause of action arose, and the state limitation rule applied to ordinary contract or malpractice actions which have nothing to do with federal law. The competing interests in Barnett appear as tension between a
federal limitation designed specifically for the rail and air industries and
a limitation which governs unfair labor practices under a separate federal act.
The Tenth Circuit based its decision to apply the section 10(b) statutory limit rather than the RLA limit, on a similarity between the RLA
hybrid action and the classic NLRA hybrid action. It appears, though it
is not clear, that there are two reasons for this arrival. First, both statutes apply the same threshold test for full review of a hybrid claim, re142. DelCostello, 103 S. Ct. at 2286.
143. Exclusive jurisdiction to interpret a collective bargaining agreement is vested in
the adjustment boards pursuant to 45 U.S.C. § 184 (1982). See Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. Central of Georgia Ry. Co., 199 F.2d 384, 385 (5th Cir.
1952) (citations omitted).
144. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 185.
145. DelCostello, 103 S. Ct. at 2294.
146. Id. at 2293.
147. See, e.g., id. at 2292-93 n.18, 19 (citations omitted).
148. Barnett, 738 F.2d at 363.
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quiring that the plaintiff show breach of the implied duty of fair
representation. Second, application of the two-year RLA limitation is
vague and no other limitation directly governs hybrid suits. The two
year statutory limit appears in a section setting forth practice of the National Railroad Adjustment Board,14 9 which does not control grievances
such as that of Barnett. This same statute, however, is incorporated in
the section creating the National Air Transport Adjustment Board' 50
which had enough relevance to this case to have been said to fit "hand in
5
glove" with the Barnett case on first hearing at the circuit.' '
D.

Conclusion

Very little evidence of Congressional intent appears in the final decision of Barnett. Instead the decision seems to hinge on Congress' intent to provide uniform limitations periods for similar suits. The Tenth
Circuit applied DelCostello blindly, and giving little, if any, rationale for
withdrawing its first decision which applied the RLA statute of limitations. It is an ironic decision, given that the case arose under the RLA,
and that the cause of action of breach of fair duty of representation
52
arose originally under the RLA.1
V.

A.

OTHER TENTH CIRCUIT LABOR DECISIONS

Donovan v. United Video, Inc.

In Donovan v. United Video, Inc., 13 the Tenth Circuit upheld a district
court ruling which found that microwave system engineers were not
"administrative employees" for purposes of the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA). 154 The court also upheld the lower court's determination
of back wages due the engineers despite the fact neither party kept accurate records.
Section 13(a)(1) of the FLSA 155 exempts "bona fide executive, administrative, or professional" employees from overtime compensation
regulations found in section 7(a)(1) 15 6 of the Act. The Department of
Labor and the courts use two tests to determine whether work performed by employees designated by their employers as "administrative"
is, in fact, exempt from overtime provisions. 15 7 The "short test' 158
used in United Video applies to persons earning more than $250 per
149. 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (r) (1982).

150. 45 U.S.C. § 185 (1982).
151. Barnett, 729 F.2d at 696 (quoting United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S.
56, 64 (1981)). United Parcel isa somewhat moot decision which should be utilized with
great care based upon its irregular procedural context. See United Parcel, 451 U.S. at 65-71
(Stewart,J., concurring).
152. See supra note 128.
153. 725 F.2d 577 (10th Cir. 1984).
154. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 to 219 (1982).
155. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (1982).
156. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (1982).
157. 29 C.F.R. § 541.2 (1984).
158. Id. § 541.2(e)(2).
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week, while the "long test,"' 159 more precise in nature, applies to persons earning less than $250 per week.
The Secretary of Labor brought suit against the employer to enforce the overtime and record keeping requirements of the Act. The
district court found the engineer's primary duty was to maintain the microwave systems, a responsibility which, for the most part, involved
truck driving and equipment inspection. The district court concluded
that the employer had violated the Act and determined the amount of
160
back wages due. The court of appeals affirmed.
The employer objected to the court's ruling on back wages on the
grounds that the number of overtime hours worked by the complaining
engineers was not settled. The circuit applied Anderson v. Mount Clemens
Pottery Co.,161 wherein the Supreme Court stated that the grieving
party's burden in a FLSA case is to show that he has performed work for
inadequate compensation, given that the court can reasonably infer the
amount of that work from the evidence. The burden then shifts to the
employer to negate the allegation as to amount and, should he fail, the
court may award damages to the employee, albeit based upon a approximation drawn from the evidence.' 62 As the employer could not come
forward with precise records as to hours worked, the district court's determination of back wages, based on the Secretary of Labor's calculations from depositions and payroll records, was affirmed.
B. Jefferson County Community Center for Development Disabilities
Inc., v. NLRB
In Jefferson County Community Centerfor Developmental Disabilities, Inc. v.
NLRB, 16 3 the Tenth Circuit enforced board orders directing a community health care facility to bargain with and supply information to an
employee's union despite the facility's insistence that it was a political
subdivision of state government and, therefore, beyond the jurisdiction
of the NLRB under section 2(2)164 of the Act. Section 2(2) of the
NLRA, which gives the board jurisdiction over labor-management relations, exempts states and their political subdivisions from its
65
provisions.1
The circuit outlined a two part test for qualification as a political
subdivision: that the entity be either created by the state as an arm of
government, or administered by those responsible directly to public officials or the electorate. 16 6 The court found that while the health care
159. Id. § 541.2(a) to (e).
160. United Video, 725 F.2d at 583-84.
161. 328 U.S. 680 (1946).
162. United Video, 725 F.2d at 583-84 (citing Anderson v. Mount Clemens Pottery Co.,
328 U.S. at 687-88; Donovan v. Simmons Petroleum Corp., 725 F.2d 83, 85-86 (10th Cir.
1983)) (other citations omitted).
163. 732 F.2d 122 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 591 (1984).
164. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1982).
165. For purposes of the Act, the term "employer" does not include "any state or
political subdivision thereof." Id.
166. Jefferson County, 732 F.2d at 124 (citing NLRB v. Natural Gas Util. Dist., 402 U.S.
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center contracts with the state on a regular basis, the state did not create
the center, nor did the facility fall within the heirarchy of an arm of government. 16 7 There was no evidence to conclude that the administration
of the center answered to public officials or the public; 16 8 moreover, the
method for removing Board members was self-contained, with no room
for involvement by the state. Additionally, the facility's lack of power to
eminent domain
issue tax-exempt bonds, issue subpoenas, or exercise
16 9
further distinguished it from political entities.
The facility offered another reason for its exemption. It claimed
that because its business primarily involved contracts with and grants
from governmental agencies it lacked "sufficient control over the employment relationship" to bargain effectively. 170 The court of appeals
recognized that the facility's ability to bargain might be restricted but
held that it controlled bargaining over "wages, benefits, hiring, firing,
promotion, discipline and grievances" sufficient to be able to bargain
71
effectively. 1

Greg Shannon Russi

600, 604-05 (1971); Board of Trustees of Memorial Hosp. v. NLRB, 624 F.2d 177, 184
(10th Cir. 1980)).
167. Jefferson County, 732 F.2d at 125.
168. Id. at 126.
169. Id.
170. Id. (citing Board of Trustees of Memorial Hosp., 624 F.2d at 185).
171. Jefferson County, 732 F.2d at 127.

